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THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: A
PRINCIPLE UNDER ATTACK
While the first amendment provides for the freedom of speech
and press in the United States,' no particular licensee of television
or radio has a first amendment right to broadcast.' The licensee's
particular privilege to broadcast may be qualified through regula-
tion.8 The award of a broadcast license may be subjected to rea-
sonable regulation in furtherance of goals other than the suppres-
sion of ideas.4
The fairness doctrine is a reasonable regulation that developed
out of reports from the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC),' the Communications Act of 1934,1 and case law.7 The
1. See US. CoNsr. amend. 1. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " d. The purpose of the first
amendment is to set up a "marketplace of ideas," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969). where "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The importance of
freedom of speech has been recognized by the courts. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (first amendment freedoms are in a preferred position); see also
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (freedom of speech is a fundamental right).
Contra Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (criticizing
the preferred position of freedom of speech).
In 1927, Justice Brandeis noted that the freedoms of speech and press fundamentally
ensured the stability of democratic government. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927). Justice Brandeis reasoned that through the promotion of public discussion,
which is the purpose of the first amendment, logic would prevail. See id.; see also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (freedom of speech will yield a more capable citizenry);
F. RowAN. BitOAmonsrr FAm,4m 15-21 (1984) (society benefits from public debate). Al-
lowing all speakers free expression of their own ideas will aid the public in choosing those
which are correct or worthy. F. RowAN, supra, at 15.
2. J. NowAx, R. RoTUNDA & J. YouNG, H Dmaoox oN CoNsrrtnoNA . LAW 894 (2d ed.
1983).
3. Id. Due to the unique nature of electronic media, see infta notes 15-22 & accompany-
ing text, and the present state of the art, there is no comparable first amendment right of
everyone to broadcast on radio and television what one could speak or publish through the
traditional media forms. J. NowAi, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG. supra note 2, at 894.
4. J. NowAx. R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, supra note 2, at 894. Regulation of broadcast
licensees is permissible because the rights of the viewing and listening public are para-
mount. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
5. Se In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) (hereinafter
cited as The 1949 Fairness Report]; The Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d I
(1974) (hereinafter cited as The 1974 Fairness Report].
6. See Pub. L No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
Fairness Doctrine
doctrine imposes two affirmative obligations on broadcast licen-
sees.8 First, a licensee must devote some broadcast time to the cov-
erage of controversial issues of public importance. Second, the
coverage must fairly represent conflicting views.10 By imposing
these duties on broadcasters, the fairness doctrine attempts to bal-
ance the free speech interest of the broadcaster with the right of
the public to be informed.11
Recently, the fairness doctrine came under criticism by the FCC
in the 1985 Fairness Report.1 2 The report attacked the constitu-
tionality of the fairness doctrine,18 and argued that the doctrine
no longer serves the public interest. 4 This Article will address the
criticisms lodged by the FCC against the doctrine. After giving a
brief history of the fairness doctrine, the Article will outline the
major points of the 1985 Fairness Report. It is submitted that the
(1982)).
7. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
8. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); The 1974 Fairness Report,
supra note 5, at 9-10.
9. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11
(1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
The courts have varied their terminology in describing the obligation of licensees to
present controversial issues to the public. Compare Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973) (coverage must be "adequate") with Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("reasona-
ble percentage of broadcast time"). See also National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) ("substantial portion of avail-
able time").
10. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); see also Public Media
Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("programming must fairly reflect
differing viewpoints on controversial issues").
11. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The aims
of the first amendment and of the fairness doctrine are the same; they both seek "to insure
an open forum for robust discussion." See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891,
910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). However, the FCC has the burden of
promoting this "open forum" while at the same time not interfering with the journalistic
processes of the broadcast. See A. Sssprmo, MzDtA Accs 16 (1976).
12. See General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg.
35,418 (1985) [hereinafter cited as The 1985 Fairness Report]. The 1985 Fairness Report
is the first major re-examination of the role of the fairness doctrine in broadcasting since
1974. See The 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 5.
13. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,422. The FCC believes that the
fairness doctrine does not promote the first amendment rights of the public and can no
longer be justified. Id.
14. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,453.
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criticisms in the report are one-sided and do not paint an accurate
picture of the doctrine as it exists today. This Article will show
why the fairness doctrine still serves the public interest.
I. HISTORY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Along with the growth of radio in the 1920's came a realization
that more people wanted to broadcast than there were available
frequencies." In response to this "spectrum scarcity" crisis, Con-
gress passed the Communications Act of 193416 which created the
Federal Communications Commission.'
In addition to granting the federal government the authority to
license broadcasters," the Act also granted the FCC the power to
enact any regulations it deemed necessary to protect the public
interest in the area of radio broadcasting." The constitutionality
of the above provision was upheld in a landmark 1943 Supreme
15. See The 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at 3. Until the Radio Act of 1927,
Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162, the federal government was largely powerless to restrict
radio broadcasting. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill.
1926). In the early 1920's Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce and Labor, tried
unsuccessfully to regulate radio broadcasters. See Hoover v. City Intercity Radio Co., 286
F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. !11. 1926). Stations would
broadcast on any desired frequency and "[w]ith everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
The radio listener in the 1920's frequently encountered reception of two or three sta-
tions at the same time. S. SiMMoNs, THE FAmNESS DocrMNE AND THE MEnIA 18 (1978). As
an example, in 1922, for three weeks in a row, two radio stations broadcast religious ser-
vices from two churches in Washington, D.C. on the same frequency. Id. "What poured
from the receivers was a pain-provoking jumble of noises that was more conducive to neu-
roses than quiet religious worship." W. EMnaa'. BaoAucASnwG AND GovEns~euNr 26 (1971).
16. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1982)).
17. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
18. See id. at § 301. The section provides in part:
[*it is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use
of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be con-
strued to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Id.
19. Se 47 U.S.C. § 303(f). Section 303 provides in part: "[Tihe Commission from time
to time, as public convenience, intest, or necessity requires, shall ... [mjake such regula-
tions not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between
stations and to carry out the provisions of this chapter .... "Id. (emphasis added); sn also
id. § 307(a) (public interest duty of the Commission in granting licenses).
Fairness Doctrine
Court decision, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States.'0
Acting pursuant to its "public interest" duties, the FCC issued a
report in 1949 that became the origin of the fairness doctrine. 1
The 1949 report, after setting out the provisions of the fairness
doctrine, concluded that the doctrine was the best way to serve
the public interest."
Congressional approval of the fairness doctrine was manifested
in the 1959 amendment of section 315 of the Communications
Act of 1934.2' The amendment, enacted to provide for "equal op-
portunity" access to broadcast stations in limited cases,2 restated
the fairness obligations of licensees.' Although the 1985 Fairness
20. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). In Na-
tional Broadcasting Company, the National Broadcasting Company [hereinafter "NBC")
brought a suit to enjoin the enforcement of certain regulations promulgated by the FCC in
the "public interest." Id. at 194. Justice Frankfurter recognized that although the Act pro-
vided the FCC with broad powers, Congress had inserted a "public interest" provision
which limited the Commission's powers. See id. at 216. Utilizing the rationale that radio
broadcasting is a "scarce resource," see id. at 226, the Court held that the FCC's authority
to act in the public interest did not violate NBC's first amendment rights. See id. at 227.
21. See The 1949 Fairness Report, supra note 5. Before the issuance of the 1949 re-
port, the components of the fairness doctrine arose in several cases. See, e.g., In re United
Broadcasting Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, 517 (1945) (sufficient broadcast time must be
made available for presentation of public concerns); In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8
F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940) (requiring "full and equal" opportunity for the coverage of all sides
of public issues).
22. See The 1949 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at 1251. The licensee's obligation to
serve the public interest necessarily includes an affirmative duty to broadcast all sides of
controversial public issues. Id. The Commission stated that there can be "no one all em-
bracing formula" to determine compliance with the doctrine. Id. Instead, each licensee is
to exercise "his best judgment and good sense" in complying with the fairness require-
ments. Id. For a discussion of the wide discretion afforded licensees in fulfilling the fairness
requirements, see infra, notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
23. See Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)).
24. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). Section 315(a) is triggered whenever a legally quali-
fied candidate for public office appears in a broadcast. See id. Once this happens, the licen-
see must give an equal opportunity to all other legally qualified candidates for that office to
use the broadcasting station. See id.
25. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). Section 315(a) provides as follows:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in
connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them
under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable oppor-
tunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
Id.
The 1959 amendments to section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 were promul-
gated as a result of the Lar Daly case. See In re Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 26 F.C.C. 715
(1959); W. FRANCOIS, MAss MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 581 (3d ed. 1982). Lar Daly was a
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Report questions whether the last line of section 315(a) is a sign of
congressional approval of the doctrine," the legislative history be-
hind its enactment" and subsequent court interpretations show
otherwise."
The Supreme Court's turn to put its imprimatur on the consti-
tutionality of the doctrine came in 1969 in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC." In Red Lion, the Court upheld the authority of the
candidate for the mayor of Chicago. In re Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 26 F.C.C. at 716.
Television stations in Chicago had shown clips of Daly's opponents in their newscasts. Id. at
716-17. Daly requested equal time under section 315 and was refused. Id. The Federal
Communications Commission held that the appearance of the candidates on the newscast
triggered the equal time provisions of section 315. Set id. at 739-40.
Congress viewed the decision as discouraging stations to show candidates on their news-
casts and amended section 315 to include an exception for newscasts. W. FRANOois, supra,
at 581. Section 315(a) now includes four types of appearances which will not trigger an
equal opportunity obligation on the part of the broadcaster:. "(1) bona fide newscast, (2)
bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news documentary ... or (4) on-the-spot coverage
of bona fide news events .... " 47 U.S.C. § 315(aXl)-(4) (1982).
26. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,446 (FCC does not believe the
1959 amendments codified the fairness doctrine).
27. See 105 CONG. Rc 14,439-63 (1959). The debate in the Senate on the amendments
to section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 demonstrated an intention to codify the
fairness doctrine. Id. Senator Pastore, arguing for the passage of the bill, commented that
"ielvery licensee who is fortunate in obtaining a license is mandated to operate in the pub-
lic interest and has assumed the obligation of presenting important public questions fairly
and without bias." Id. at 14,439 (statement of Senator Pastore) (emphasis added). "Under
existing law and policy it is absolutely mandatory that [the licensees] serve the public inter-
est because these media are in the public domain and, therefore, they should be fair in
their treatment in all events." Id. at 14,440. Senator Pastore asserted that the provision of
the amendment to section 315(a) restating the fairness doctrine was written for the sole
purpose of reminding the FCC and broadcasters that Congress was "not abandoning the
philosophy that gave birth to section 315, in giving the people the right to have a full and
complete disclosure of conflicting views on news of interest to the people of the country."
Id.
28. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-86; see also Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 n.8 (the 1959 amendments
statutorily approved the fairness doctrine). The Red Lim Court noted that after thirty
years of administrative construction, Congress specifically adopted that same construction.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 382. The Court stated that the amendment vindicated the FCC's
view, at that time, that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard of the
1934 Act. Id. at 380.
The FCC, in 1978, adopted a regulation expressly affirming that the fairness doctrine is
contained in section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910.
29. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In 1964, the Red Lion
Broadcasting Company, a Pennsylvania radio station, conducted a program by the Rever-
end Billy James Hargis in which he verbally attacked Fred Cook. See i& at 371. Reverend
Hargis, in discussing a book written by Cook about Barry Goldwater, said that Cook had
made false charges against a New York City official. Id. at 371 n.2. Reverend Hargis also
implied that Cook was a communist and otherwise attacked his character. See id. Cook
demanded free reply time to answer the criticisms and was refused by the station. See id. at
Fairness Doctrine
FCC to promulgate the personal attack rule and the political edi-
torializing rule.30 The personal attack rule gives a person whose
honesty, character or integrity are attacked in the course of a
broadcast the right to a reasonable opportunity to respond."' The
political editorializing rule applies to licensee endorsement of a le-
gally qualified candidate.3 2 The Court held that these specific ap-
plications of the fairness doctrine do not violate the first amend-
ment rights of the broadcast licensees." The Red Lion Court
recognized the necessity of the government's involvement in
granting licenses because of the scarcity of the spectrum." The
371-72. Instead, Red Lion responded to Cook's demands for time by sending him their
"rate card" in order to purchase air time. F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GUYS AND
THE Fntsr AMENDMENT 44 (1975). Cook replied that it was Red Lion's obligation to provide
him with free time to respond or it was conceivable that radio stations would be able to
conduct a profitable business by selling reply time to persons who have been slandered. Id.
(quoting from a letter by Fred J. Cook to John M. Norris, December 3 1, 1964). Cook
subsequently filed a fairness complaint with the FCC. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 372; F.
FRIENDLY, supra, at 44. Red Lion challenged the fairness doctrine claiming it was an
abridgment of their freedom of speech and press. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386. Red Lion
claimed a right to continue using their frequency at all times with a right to exclude any-
body from broadcasting. Id.
Red Lion was joined with another case before the Supreme Court, United States v. Radio
Television News Directors Ass'n [hereinafter "RTNDA"J. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
In RTNDA, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the newly enacted FCC
rules concerning personal attacks and political editorializing in broadcasts were unconstitu-
tional. See Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1020
(7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see aLso infra notes 31-32 (discussing the provi-
sions of the personal attack and political editorializing rules).
30. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
31. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1984). In addition, the licensee must notify the person at-
tacked, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(aXI) (1984), and must give him a script or a tape of the attack,
47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(aX2) (1984). Exceptions to this rule include verbal attacks on foreign
groups, foreign public figures and verbal attacks made during newscasts, bona fide news
interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(bX!)-
(4) (1984) (the last series of exceptions for newscast and news events are identical to those
exceptions found in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)).
32. Se 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930(aX2XA) (1984). If the licensee either endorses or opposes a
legally qualified candidate, the licensee is required to notify the other candidates and offer
them a reasonable opportunity to respond. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930(aX2XA),(C) (1984).
33. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). In Red Lion, the
Court held that the fairness doctrine met all the standards for constitutionality and upheld
the fairness complaint of Cook. Id. at 375, 400-01.
34. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367. 376, 389 (1969). The unique
characteristics of broadcasting, with its scarcity of frequencies, justify certain obligations
placed on licensees. See id at 388. In an oft quoted phrase, the Court noted, "[ilt is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Id. at 390. Justice White, in recounting the history of broadcast regulation, asserted,
"[w]ithout government control, the [broadcast] medium would be of little use because of
the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard."
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Court stated that to require licensees to act as fiduciaries for views
"which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the air-
waves" does not violate the first amendment.u Although the
Court stated that if the doctrine effectively reduced coverage, its
constitutionality should be reconsidered," it is submitted that the
Red Lion doctrine is still valid today.
The development of the fairness doctrine was also, to an extent,
refined through FCC reportsa' and rulings in specific cases.U It is
submitted that within this historical background, the 1985 Fair-
ness Report is not a further refinement of the doctrine in order to
assure first amendment rights.
II. THE 1985 FAIRNESS REPORT
Seeing a need to reexamine the implications of the fairness doc-
trine, the FCC, in May of 1984, sought input from qualified par-
ties concerning the doctrine" and, on August 7, 1985, issued a
report detailing its findings.' The report attacked the doctrine on
Id. at 376. The Red Lion Court also concluded that scarcity of the electromagnetic spec-
trum still existed in 1969. See id. at 396. Although new technology has led to more efficient
use of the electromagnetic spectrum, uses for the frequencies have also increased. Id. at
397. The Court concluded that scarcity of the spectrum exists as long as "there are more
immediate and potential uses than can be accommodated, and for which wise planning is
essential." See id. at 399.
35. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). Contra W. FaANOtas,
supra note 25, at 542-43 (fiduciary concept ignores first amendment rights of broadcasters).
36. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
37. See, e.g., The 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at 13 (defining a "reasonable
opportunity for contrasting viewpoints"); The 1949 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at 1250-
51 (obligations of "fairness" imposed on broadcasters).
38. See, e.g., In re Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 709 (1970) (access required when
spokespersons for candidates are broadcast is somewhere between broad overall balance
and absolute equal opportunity); In re Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577
(1963) (broadcaster must provide free time to opposing groups to respond if they cannot
obtain sponsorship).
39. Notice of Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (May 14, 1984).
40. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12. The 1985 Report is a broad based
attack on the principles underlying the fairness doctrine. See id. at 35,445.
After questioning the constitutional and policy arguments for the fairness doctrine, the
Commission, nonetheless, decided it could not cease enforcing it. Id. at 35,453. Instead,
the FCC deferred to Congress whether to modify, restrict or abandon the doctrine alto-
gether. Id. The deference to Congress is necessary as it is unclear if the fairness doctrine
was codified in 47 U.S.C. Section 315(a) (1984). Id. at 35,448. If Congress does not act on
the report's findings, and if it is determined that the fairness doctrine is not statutorily
mandated, future courts are likely to rely heavily upon the Commission's judgment regard-
ing the public interest, given that the FCC is the expert agency charged with the issue. See
70
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three fronts: its constitutionality, its "chilling effect" on coverage
of controversial issues, and its inappropriateness in light of the ex-
panding marketplace for information.4 1 In order to facilitate ex-
amination of the report, each area of concern will be analyzed
separately.
A. Constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine
The 1985 Fairness Report questioned the constitutionality of
the fairness doctrine4' and suggested that the conditions on which
Red Lion was premised no longer exist. 43 The FCC noted that the
Court in Red Lion did not give its approval to all aspects of the
doctrine. 4 Furthermore, it noted that the question of constitu-
tionality should be reconsidered if the fairness doctrine has the
net effect of reducing the "volume and quality of coverage.f'
46
The report criticized the doctrine as bringing the government
into the constitutionally disfavored role of examining editorial
decisionmaking. 6 The report then cited Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo4l as supporting authority for that criticism.4 8 In
Miami Herald Publishing Co., a statute requiring newspapers to give
space to someone who had been personally attacked was struck
FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981).
41. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,445-46; inffa notes 43-63 and
accompanying text.
42. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,420.
43. Id. The report states three reasons why Red Lion does not mandate that the fairness
doctrine should still apply. Id. First, the Red Lion Court did not approve every aspect of the
fairness doctrine. Id. Second, Red Lion requires reconsideration of the doctrine's constitu-
tionality if it has the net effect of inhibiting coverage. Id. Third, the broadcasting market-
place has changed in the sixteen years since Red Lion. Id.
44. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,420; set Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
45. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,420 (quoting Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969)).
46. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,434. The FCC describes the evalua-
tion process used in deciding a fairness complaint as follows:
In evaluating whether or not a broadcaster has met his or her balanced program-
ming obligations under the fairness doctrine, we are obligated to determine whether
or not the broadcaster made a reasonable determination as to whether or not the
programming presented controversial issues of public importance, and if so, we must
assess whether or not the broadcaster provided reasonable opportunities for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints.
Id.
47. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
48. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,434.
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down as inconsistent with the first amendment right of free
press." The FCC applied Miami Herald to the broadcasting indus-
try by citing the case as supportive of its theory that the fairness
doctrine implicates the government as an unconstitutional regula-
tor of program content."
B. Chilling Effect of the Doctrine
Another aspect of the doctrine under attack by the FCC is the
deleterious effect it has on journalistic discretion."1 The 1985 Re-
port, relying on testimony of various broadcast journalists, con-
cluded that the fairness doctrine has had a "chilling effect" on the
presentation of controversial issues." Since the requirement of
licensees to present controversial issues" is easier to comply with
than the requirement to present conflicting views on those issues
fairly," the net effect, it is contended, is for broadcasters to air
only the minimum amount of coverage necessary to satisfy the
first requirement." The fear of government sanction, the FCC
49. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
50. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,434.
51. See id. at 35,426-27.
52. Id. An example of the fairness doctrine's "chilling effect" on broadcasters is related
by Dan Rather of CBS News. See id. Mr. Rather speaks of working at his first job at a radio
station. Id. It was there that he learned of the fairness doctrine and noticed that there
would be constant concern as to what the implications of airing a report would be. Id.
53. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The first prong of the fairness doctrine
requires licensees to provide coverage of important controversial issues that concern the
community. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,418. A licensee has broad
discretion as to what issue is controversial. See id. at 35,423. Moreover, a first prong viola-
tion will be triggered only when it is determined that the issue the licensee failed to present
is of "critical importance." In re Brent Buell, 97 F.C.C.2d 55, 57 (1984). A broadcast is not
required to air every important issue. The 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at 9-10.
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Under the fairness doctrine, when a li-
censee broadcasts controversial issues it is required to present contrasting views. The 1985
Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,418. Although the licensee is required to allow re-
sponse time, the fairness doctrine does not require the allocation of equal time. See Ken-
nedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 905 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 843
(1972)) (only reasonable response time required); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 332 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (reasonableness sole criterion as to response time).
It is important to note that evaluation of doctrine compliance is not judged by a single
incident. See Kennedy, 636 F.2d at 452. The nature of the entire programming of the licen-
see is considered. See id. The inquiry is whether the entire programming content repre-
sents a reasonable effort to present contrasting views. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC,
460 F.2d 891, 902 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
55. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,423. In the 1985 Fairness Re-
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claims, is one reason why broadcasters seek to avoid fairness obli-
gations and thus lessens their coverage of controversial issues."
C. The Expanding Marketplace
Finally, the FCC asserted that the need for a fairness doctrine
no longer exists since new information technologies, coupled with
the growth of traditional broadcast facilities, provides the public
with suitable access to doctrine-related information."7 Specifically,
the increasing penetration of cable television into our homes, the
FCC argued, has provided an abundance of information without
the need for government regulation." The FCC rejected the con-
tention that there is no substitute for broadcast television"' and
that television operates in a different informational marketplace
than newspapers." The Commission also claimed that there has
been a significant increase in the number of television stations
port, the FCC noted a paucity of challenges under the first part of the fairness doctrine
due to the broad discretion a licensee has in determining the actual controversial issues it
will present. See id. at 34,424. The Commission claims that a violation of the second obliga-
tion, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of opposing views, is easier to
trigger than the first. Id. It is this asymmetry that encourages the airing of no more than a
minimal amount of programming devoted to controversial issues of public importance. Id.
56. See id. 35,424. Strict compliance with the fairness doctrine has been characterized
by the FCC as the "sine qua non" for the renewal of a broadcasting license. Id. As the
government sanction of denying renewal is severe, the FCC claims that a licensee will not
provide coverage of certain issues in order to avoid challenges to compliance with the doc-
trine's second prong.
57. See id. at 35,436. To assert that new technologies obviate the need for the fairness
doctrine, the FCC had to show that there is substitutability among the newly available tech-
nologies and television and radio broadcasting. See id. at 35,437. If it was unable to prove
this, then the additional presentation of controversial issues resulting from the new media
would be irrelevant to the broadcasting industry. See id.
58. Id. In the 1985 Fairness Report, the FCC mentions several types of new media that
render the fairness doctrine obsolete. The new media mentioned are as follows: cable tele-
vision, low power television, multipoint distribution service, multichannel multipoint distri-
bution service and satellite master antenna service. Id. At least one commentator, however,
has argued that the fairness doctrine should apply to some of these new media technolo-
gies. See Swillinger, Candidates and the New Technologies, 49 Mo. L REv. 85, 86 (1984).
59. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,437. The FCC denies "that the
purported dominance of one media voice necessarily detracts from the significance of other
voices with respect to the availability of antagonistic and diverse sources of information."
Id.
60. Id. The fact that newspapers are read while television and radio are perceived in a
more casual manner does not justify the conclusion that they are in separate marketplaces.
Id.
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since Red Lion."' The FCC concluded that the new technologies
"provide the public with suitable access to the marketplace of
ideas so as to render the fairness doctrine unnecessary.""
III. A CASE FOR THE FAIRNESS DOC-RINE
A. The Fairness Doctrine is Constitutional'
A constitutional basis for the fairness doctrine was found in Red
Lion." It is submitted that the holding and the justifications for
the decision in Red Lion are still valid today.
While the broadcasting industry may operate with restraints not
imposed on other media forms, a de facto determination of first
amendment infringement is not necessary." Congress has the
power to regulate the airwaves, provided that the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" would thereby be served." Once the
government is placed in the position of granting licenses to pre-
61. Id. at 35,438. The data released in the 1985 Fairness Report show an increase of 13
percent in the number of VHF television stations since Red Lion and an increase of 8 per-
cent since the release of the 1974 Fairness Report. Id.
62. Id. at 35,436.
63. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969); see supra notes
29-36 and accompanying text.
64. FCC v. League of Women Voters, - U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3118 (1984). Jus-
tice Brennan, in League of Women Voters, asserted that "although the broadcasting industry
plainly operates under restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these restric-
tions had generally been to secure the public's First Amendment interest in receiving a
balanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public concern . I... "d  at -. 104 S.
Ct. at 3118.
The Red Lion case asserts that the different treatment afforded the broadcasting media is
not in and of itself unconstitutional. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
386 (1969). "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id. at
388 (emphasis added).
65. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 (1984);
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); National
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190. 216 (1943).
The Court in League of Women Voters stated:
[Fjirst, we have long recognized that Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, has power to regulate the use of [the airwaves]. The distinctive feature of
Congress' efforts in this area has been to ensure through the regulatory oversight of
the FCC that only those who satisfy the "public interest, convenience and necessity"
are granted a license to use radio and television broadcast frequencies.
League of Womnm Voters, - U.S. at - 104 S. Ct. at 3116. An important result of the
power to regulate is the FCC's authority to grant licenses. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982).
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serve the airwaves as a viable means of communications," the fair-
ness doctrine is used for balancing the competing interests of the
broadcaster with the public interest."
The contention that a licensee is not a fiduciary acting for the
public interest conflicts with Supreme Court pronouncements"
and congressional legislation. 9 The Supreme Court in Red Lion
recognized the fact that the people own the airwaves.70 As a re-
sult, the rights of the viewers become more important than the
rights of the broadcasters. 7' A license is not a government grant
of an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource, the electro-
magnetic spectrum, 7  rather, it is a government grant conditioned
on the licensee's acting in the public interest.7
It is submitted that the FCC's use of Miami Herald to discredit
the fairness doctrine7 4 is unconvincing based on the distinctions
between the newspaper and broadcast industries. Each medium
deserves its own first amendment standard taking into account its
unique characteristics. 76 When comparing newspapers to televi-
66. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
67. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117(1973). "(The] role of the Government as an 'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian
of the public interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic 'free agent' call for a
delicate balancing of competing interests." Id.
68. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969); National Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
70. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). "[T]he people as
a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment." Id.
71. Id.; see also W. FRAtooxs, supra note 25, at 543-44 (fiduciary concept views licensee
as a trustee for the public).
72. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969). The Red Lion Court
viewed the FCC's licensing procedure as superior to forced sharing under which blocks of
time would be assigned to a broadcaster for a specified part of a day or week. Id. Pursuant
to the imposed licensing scheme, a licensee is conferred a virtual monopoly, however, it
must make time available to people with viewpoints opposing those expressed on the sta-
tion. Set id.
73. See id. at 391; supra note 65 and accompanying text.
74. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,434; see also supra notes 47-50
and accompanying text (discussing the FCC's implication of the fairness doctrine via Miami
Herald).
75. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Supreme Court decisions have gener-
ally applied a different first amendment standard for broadcast regulation than in other
media forms. FCC v. League of Women Voters, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3115 (1984).
In other forms of media, some regulation of speech is permitted, provided it serves a com-
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sion or radio stations, the most obvious distinction is the physical
scarcity of the radio spectrum.76 Television is inherently not avail-
able to all potential broadcasters and consequently the govern-
ment is forced to monitor the broadcasting industry." Newspa-
pers, at least theoretically, are available to anyone willing to buy a
newspaper press.78 It is submitted that once the government is in-
jected into the licensing process out of necessity, it is its duty to
act in the public interest and the fairness doctrine is a guarantee
of this."
B. The Fairness Doctrine is Not "Chilling"
Aware of the possibility of a "chilling effect" on broadcast jour-
nalists, the evolution of the fairness doctrine has given licensee's
wide latitude and discretion in presenting controversial issues."
pelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. League of Women Vot-
ers v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 384 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aJ'd, - U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 3106
(1984). The "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them." League of Women Voters, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct.
at 3116 (1984) (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367. 386 (1969)).
The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of broadcasting, from other media, that
mandates a specialized first amendment analysis is the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies.
See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3116. Other distinguishing characteristics of the broadcasting
media were pointed out in a 1978 Supreme Court case dealing with an "obscene" radio
broadcast. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 759-60 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Broadcasts reach unsupervised children and come directly into the home. Id. Fur-
thermore, listeners and viewers of the broadcast media are in actuality a "captive audi-
ence" and the FCC can take this fact into account. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at
127. For a discussion of frequency spectrum scarcity, see supra notes 15-20.
76. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, - U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 (1984).
77. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101(1973).
78. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). "[T]he physical limitations of the [broadcast media] restrict
the number of those who would broadcast whereas expression by publication is, at least in
theory, available to all." Id.; see also Comment, The Fairness Doctrine. Protection For a Scarce
Public Resource, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J 1083, 1105 (1983) (print media is more accessible to
opposing views).
79. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"[T]he doctrine remains a vital aspect of a broadcasting regime characterized by a delicate
balance of fiduciary duties to the public and right of journalistic discretion." Id.
80. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, I11
(1973) (broadcaster is allowed significant journalistic discretion in complying with the doc-
trine); see also Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC. 717 F.2d 1471, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) ("ample deference" allowed broadcaster); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (reasonableness is all that is required of licensee);
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (voluntary good-faith
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The standard of reasonableness is imposed on the licensee, and
absent bad faith or abuse of discretion it will not be held violative
of the fairness doctrine.81 It is submitted that this standard of re-
view allows the licensee to be aggressive in its coverage while
shielding it from petty complaints about its coverage. In addition,
the FCC is still able to enforce the first prong of the fairness test
should the licensee fail to provide adequate attention to public
issues.82
In addition to applying a lenient standard towards licensees in
deciding fairness complaints, the FCC requires that the complain-
ant set forth a prima fade case." In order to weed out insubstan-
tial complaints which might have a chilling effect, the complainant
must specifically indicate the nature of his grievance." The fair-
ness doctrine has been enforced with a "light hand" as is evident
by the fact that from 1973 to 1976, a fairness doctrine complaint
had approximately a one-in-one-thousand chance of obtaining a
favorable ruling.85
C. The New Media and the Fairness Doctrine Can Coexist
The Commission's argument that the growth of new media
compliance by licensee).
81. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127
(1973) (Commission's responsibility is to decide if licensee made a sustained good faith ef-
fort); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (must show
unreasonableness or abuse of discretion).
82. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393-94 (1969). A "'chilling
effect" due to the fairness doctrine is unlikely because the FCC has authority to require
coverage of public issues and to deny licenses to broadcasters that fail to comply. Id.
83. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam). The requirement of a primafaot case in fairness complaints acts as a "formidable
procedural barrier" against a chilling effect. American Security Council Education Found.
v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
84. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam). Some of the required items for a prima face case for a fairness complaint are: (1)
the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature discussed
over the air; (3) the date and time when the program was carried; (4) the basis for the
claim that only one side of the question was presented, and (5) whether the station has
afforded, or plans to afford an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.
Id. Moreover, the complainant has the initial burden of proving a fairness violation. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
85. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1478 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
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technologies, such as cable television, has rendered the fairness
doctrine useless" is based more on theory than empirical evi-
dence.0 Cable television penetrates only thirty-five percent of the
television households in the United States," and much of the pro-
gramming on cable television is devoted to entertainment and not
the dissemination of information." Access by the public to the
media today is still limited," and it is the government's job to pro-
tect those unable to gain access.' 1
The viability of the fairness doctrine in light of the new tech-
nologies was affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court as
recently as 1983 when it held that "[t]he doctrine remains a vital
aspect of a broadcasting regime characterized by a delicate bal-
ance of fiduciary duties to the public and rights of journalistic
discretion.""
IV. CONCLUSION
The role of the first amendment in our present electronic me-
dia has been the subject of much debate. On the one hand, we
have the broadcasters claiming the freedom of speech as their
shield from any governmental intrusion, and on the other hand,
the proponents of the fairness doctrine claim that the doctrine
protects the aims of the first amendment by promoting discussion
of public issues.
Into this fray enters the 1985 Fairness Report authored by the
Federal Communications Commission, the very same agency au-
thorized to enforce the fairness doctrine. While the report seeks
to reevaluate the necessity and value of the fairness doctrine in
present day broadcasting, its methods are narrow and unforceful.
By denying that there is a limited means of access to the airwaves,
86. See The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 12, at 35,438-42.
87. See Ferris & Ballad, Independent Political Action Groups: New Life for the Fairness Doc-
trine, 36 VAND. L REv. 929, 944 (1983).
88. Id. at 946.
89. Id.
90. Comment, supra note 78, at 1099.
91. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
92. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
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the FCC report is barring voices from the airwaves which, without
the fairness doctrine, would not be heard. This consequence, and
not the operation of the doctrine, is the inhibiting factor on cov-
erage of controversial public issues.
The report also errs in its assessment of a "chilling effect" on
coverage. The FCC fails to accurately describe the standard of re-
view in fairness complaints: the wide discretion afforded licensees
in presenting both sides of an issue, the need for a primafacie case,
and the almost automatic dismissal of complaints absent a showing
of bad faith on the part of the broadcaster. In addition, the report
overemphasizes the impact of new technologies on the coverage
of controversial issues.
The 1985 Fairness Report admits that its findings have no im-
mediate significance. However, it is strongly urged that any court
or legislature relying on it consider the policy and constitutional
arguments that are behind it. The current wave of government
deregulation should not strike down a necessary and vital aspect
of our broadcasting media. To do so would deny the great major-
ity of people any access to the airwaves they own.
Richard Halpern
